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Abstract 
A Fortiori Logic: Innovations, History and Assessments, by Avi Sion, is a wide-ranging and in-
depth study of a fortiori reasoning, comprising a great many new theoretical insights into such 
argument, a history of its use and discussion from antiquity to the present day, and critical analyses 
of the main attempts at its elucidation. Its purpose is nothing less than to lay the foundations for a 
new branch of logic and greatly develop it; and thus, to once and for all dispel the many fallacious 
ideas circulating regarding the nature of a fortiori reasoning. 
The work is divided into three parts. The first part, Formalities, presents the author’s largely 
original theory of a fortiori argument, in all its forms and varieties. Its four (or eight) principal 
moods are analyzed in great detail and formally validated, and secondary moods are derived from 
them. A crescendo argument is distinguished from purely a fortiori argument, and similarly 
analyzed and validated. These argument forms are clearly distinguished from the pro rata and 
analogical forms of argument. Moreover, we examine the wide range of a fortiori argument; the 
possibilities of quantifying it; the formal interrelationships of its various moods; and their 
relationships to syllogistic and analogical reasoning. Although a fortiori argument is shown to be 
deductive, inductive forms of it are acknowledged and explained. Although a fortiori argument is 
essentially ontical in character, more specifically logical-epistemic and ethical-legal variants of it 
are acknowledged. 
The second part of the work, Ancient and Medieval History, looks into use and discussion of a 
fortiori argument in Greece and Rome, in the Talmud, among post-Talmudic rabbis, and in 
Christian, Moslem, Chinese and Indian sources. Aristotle’s approach to a fortiori argument is 
described and evaluated. There is a thorough analysis of the Mishnaic qal vachomer argument, and 
a reassessment of the dayo principle relating to it, as well as of the Gemara’s later take on these 
topics. The valuable contribution, much later, by Moshe Chaim Luzzatto is duly acknowledged. 
Lists are drawn up of the use of a fortiori argument in the Jewish Bible, the Mishna, the works of 
Plato and Aristotle, the Christian Bible and the Koran; and the specific moods used are identified. 
Moreover, there is a pilot study of the use of a fortiori argument in the Gemara, with reference to 
Rodkinson’s partial edition of the Babylonian Talmud, setting detailed methodological guidelines 
for a fuller study. There is also a novel, detailed study of logic in general in the Torah. 
The third part of the present work, Modern and Contemporary Authors, describes and evaluates 
the work of numerous (some thirty) recent contributors to a fortiori logic, as well as the articles on 
the subject in certain lexicons. Here, we discover that whereas a few authors in the last century or 
so made some significant contributions to the field, most of them shot woefully off-target in various 
ways. The work of each author, whether famous or unknown, is examined in detail in a dedicated 
chapter, or at least in a section; and his ideas on the subject are carefully weighed. The variety of 
theories that have been proposed is impressive; and stands witness to the complexity and 
elusiveness of the subject, and to the crying need for the present critical and integrative study. But 
whatever the intrinsic value of each work, it must be realized that even errors and lacunae are 
interesting because they teach us how not to proceed. 
This book also contains, in a final appendix, some valuable contributions to general logic, including 
new analyses of symbolization and axiomatization, existential import, the tetralemma, the Liar 
paradox and the Russell paradox.  
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Foreword 
When I started writing the present work, in late 2010, I thought it would take a dozen pages and a 
couple of weeks at most to say what I felt the need to say. I had, I believed, said most of what 
needed to be said in my previous foray in the field of a fortiori logic, in my 1995 study of Judaic 
logic. But having noticed that some people were still writing on the subject without reference to 
my work, and to boot were making serious mistakes, I felt the need to show them the errors of their 
ways. However, as I proceeded in this set task, I found myself more and more involved in its 
intricacies. 
For a start, to be fair the critiques had to be detailed, and show exactly what had been said and 
where lay the errors and lacunae. Secondly, I kept discovering more and more commentaries which 
needed to be similarly reviewed and evaluated. Thirdly, it became obvious that I needed to expand 
my theoretical investigations, to be able to answer various questions these commentaries brought 
up, consciously or unconsciously. Eventually, I realized that I had to aim for a history of the subject 
and a survey of more recent contributions to it, to be able to demonstrate precisely who said what 
first. 
Thus, the work ended up taking me three years to complete. Three parts emerged. The first 
presented my new, much more detailed theory of a fortiori argument. The second part traced the 
early history of use and discussion of such argument, so far as I could make it out with the resources 
available to me. The third focused on modern commentaries on the subject. However, these parts 
did not emerge separately, but repeatedly impinged on each other, so that many chapters or sections 
had to be written more than once to be adapted to new findings. For this reason, it was impossible 
to publish any part of the work before it was all done. 
It should be stressed that the work did not proceed in the order that the chapters are now set out. 
Whereas now all commentators are ordered chronologically, I did not comment on their work in 
their order of appearance in history. It was all a matter of chance encounter and personal mood. 
Moreover, my theoretical baggage at each stage was different. For this reason, some earlier chapters 
may appear more perspicacious or analytically cutting than some later ones. I tried, of course, to 
harmonize things as much as I could; but as the book grew in size, it became more and more 
unwieldy. No doubt my memory in these later years is not what it was once; so I may have missed 
some things. 
 
1. Innovations 
The present work is replete with valuable innovations in the field of a fortiori logic, and in other, 
related subjects. The present, wider ranging research confirms that my past work in this field, in 
my 1995 book, Judaic Logic, was novel and important. But moreover, the present work corrects 
some inaccuracies in that past work, and greatly enlarges and sharpens our theory of a fortiori 
argument, so that it may be said to address almost every nook and cranny of the subject. There is 
not a single topic that I worked on here that did not yield some new insight or new theoretical 
development in a fortiori logic. This means that the research was certainly worthwhile and 
interesting; it is not a mere collection and rehashing of old material. 
‘Formalities’, part one of the present volume, presents the author’s largely original theory of a 
fortiori argument, in all its forms and varieties. Its four (or eight) principal moods are analyzed in 
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great detail and formally validated, and secondary moods are derived from them. A crescendo 
argument is distinguished from purely a fortiori argument, and similarly analyzed and validated. 
These argument forms are clearly distinguished from the pro rata and analogical forms of argument. 
Moreover, we examine the wide range of a fortiori argument; the possibilities of quantifying it; the 
formal interrelationships of its various moods; and their relationships to syllogistic and analogical 
reasoning. Although a fortiori argument is shown to be deductive, inductive forms of it are 
acknowledged and explained. Although a fortiori argument is essentially ontical in character, more 
specifically logical-epistemic and ethical-legal variants of it are acknowledged. 
The present work also contains, in a final appendix, valuable innovations relating to certain topics 
in general logic; namely, symbolization and axiomatization, existential import, the tetralemma, 
the Liar paradox and the Russell paradox. 
 
2. History 
Logic science, properly conceived, is not just a theoretical enterprise, but also an investigation into 
the historical roots of the forms of human discourse. The present work on a fortiori logic constitutes 
an excellent case study of how a particular form of thought is rooted deep in antiquity (in history), 
and probably much earlier, in language itself (in prehistory), and then gradually develops as 
awareness of it dawns, expands and intensifies. There is ample evidence that a fortiori discourse 
existed in very ancient times and in very diverse cultures. A fortiori reasoning was present in early 
Greek literature (Homer, Aesop), long before Aristotle first discussed it (in his Rhetoric and 
Topics); and it was present before that in Jewish literature (the Torah and other Biblical books). 
Aristotle did not invent the a fortiori argument, any more than he invented the syllogism; he 
‘merely’ observed, described and explained them, as a botanist might notice and catalogue 
interesting plants. 
‘Ancient and Medieval History’, part two of the present volume, looks into use and discussion of a 
fortiori argument in Greece and Rome, in the Talmud, among post-Talmudic rabbis, and in 
Christian, Moslem, Chinese and Indian sources. Aristotle’s approach to a fortiori argument is 
described and evaluated. There is a thorough analysis of the Mishnaic qal vachomer argument, and 
a reassessment of the dayo principle relating to it, as well as of the Gemara’s later take on these 
topics. The valuable contribution, much later, by Moshe Chaim Luzzatto is duly acknowledged. 
Lists are drawn up of the use of a fortiori argument in the Jewish Bible, the Mishna, the works of 
Plato and Aristotle, the Christian Bible and the Koran; and the specific moods used are identified. 
Moreover, there is a pilot study of the use of a fortiori argument in the Gemara, with reference to 
Rodkinson’s partial edition of the Babylonian Talmud, setting detailed methodological guidelines 
for a fuller study. There is also a novel, detailed study of logic in general in the Torah. 
 
3. Assessments 
When I started to study a fortiori logic, I was little aware of the number of people who have since 
the late 19th century attempted to describe and explain this common form of reasoning. The field 
seemed nearly empty of contributors, a desert yet to be explored. Only little by little did I realize 
that many people have indeed tried their hand at solving the enigma of a fortiori argument – some, 
to be sure, more competently than others. It gradually became clear that a survey of existing 
contributors needed to be made, and their work had to be carefully studied and assessed. Such 
assessment depended, of course, on the theoretical and historiographical work undertaken earlier. 
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It was interesting to see how many of the contributors studied past work very little before proposing 
their own ideas. Each apparently thought he was one of the first explorers. 
‘Modern and Contemporary Authors’, part three of the present work, describes and evaluates the 
work of numerous (some thirty) recent contributors to a fortiori logic, as well as the articles on the 
subject in certain lexicons. Here, we discover that whereas a few authors in the last century or so 
made some significant contributions to the field, most of them shot woefully off-target in various 
ways. The work of each author, whether famous or unknown, is examined in detail in a dedicated 
chapter, or at least in a section; and his ideas on the subject are carefully weighed. The variety of 
theories that have been proposed is astonishing; and stands witness to the complexity and 
elusiveness of the subject, and to the crying need for the present critical and integrative study. But 
whatever the intrinsic value of each work, it must be realized that even errors and lacunae are 
interesting because they teach us how not to proceed. 
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Sample text (chapter 1, sections 1-3) 
1. Copulative a fortiori arguments 
Based on close analysis of a large number of Biblical and Talmudic examples (some known to 
Jewish tradition and some newly identified by me), as well as examples from everyday discourse, 
I discovered and proposed in my book Judaic Logic the four valid moods of copulative a fortiori 
argument listed below. 
An a fortiori argument consists of three propositions called the major premise, the minor premise 
and the conclusion. A copulative such argument is one involving terms. It comprises four terms, 
which are always symbolized in the same way. The four terms are called the major, the minor, the 
middle and the subsidiary; and the symbols for them are respectively P, Q, R and S1. Other 
terminology used will be clarified as we proceed. 
 
a. The positive subjectal {+s} mood: 
 
P is more R than (or as much R as) Q (is R), 
and Q is R enough to be S; 
therefore, all the more (or equally), P is R enough to be S. 
 
Notice that the valid inference goes ‘from minor to major’; that is, from the minor term (Q) to the 
major one (P); meaning: from the minor term as subject of ‘R enough to be S’ in the minor premise, 
to the major term as subject of same in the conclusion. Any attempt to go from major to minor in 
the same way (i.e. positively) would be invalid inference. 
b. The negative subjectal {–s} mood: 
 
P is more R than (or as much R as) Q (is R), 
yet P is R not enough to be S; 
therefore, all the more (or equally), Q is R not enough to be S. 
 
Notice that the valid inference goes ‘from major to minor’; that is, from the major term (P) to the 
minor one (Q); meaning: from the major term as subject of ‘R not enough to be S’ in the minor 
premise, to the minor term as subject of same in the conclusion. Any attempt to go from minor to 
major in the same way (i.e. negatively) would be invalid inference. 
We can summarize all information about subjectal argument as follows: “Given that P is more R 
than or as much R as Q is R, it follows that: if Q is R enough to be S, then P is R enough to be S; 
and if P is R not enough to be S, then Q is R not enough to be S; on the other hand, if Q is R not 
enough to be S, it does not follow that P is R not enough to be S; and if P is R enough to be S, it 
                                                 
 
1  Notice that the symbols R and S, respectively, happen to match the words “Range” (the middle item always 
refers to a range) and Subsidiary. 
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does not follow that Q is R enough to be S.” In this summary format, we resort to nesting: the major 
premise serves as primary antecedent, and the valid minor premises and conclusions appear as 
consequent conditions and outcomes, while the invalid moods are expressed as non-sequiturs. 
For example: granted Jack (P) can run faster (R) than Jill (Q), it follows that: if Jill can run (at a 
speed of) one mile in under 15 minutes (S), then surely so can Jack; and if he can’t, then neither 
can she. Needless to say, the conditions are presumed identical in both cases; we are talking of the 
same course, in the same weather, and so on. If different conditions are intended, the argument may 
not function correctly. The a fortiori argument is stated categorically only if there are no underlying 
conditions. Obviously, if there are conditions they ought to be specified, or at least we must ensure 
they are the same throughout the argument. 
 
c. The positive predicatal {+p} mood: 
 
More (or as much) R is required to be P than (as) to be Q, 
and S is R enough to be P; 
therefore, all the more (or equally), S is R enough to be Q. 
 
Notice that the valid inference goes ‘from major to minor’; that is, from the major term (P) to the 
minor one (Q); meaning: from the major term as predicate of ‘S is R enough to be’ in the minor 
premise, to the minor term as predicate of same in the conclusion. Any attempt to go from minor 
to major in the same way (i.e. positively) would be invalid inference. 
d. The negative predicatal {–p} mood: 
 
More (or as much) R is required to be P than (as) to be Q, 
yet S is R not enough to be Q; 
therefore, all the more (or equally), S is R not enough to be P. 
 
Notice that the valid inference goes ‘from minor to major’; that is, from the minor term (Q) to the 
major one (P); meaning: from the minor term as predicate of ‘S is R not enough to be’ in the minor 
premise, to the major term as predicate of same in the conclusion. Any attempt to go from major to 
minor in the same way (i.e. negatively) would be invalid inference. 
We can summarize all information about predicatal argument as follows: “Given that more or as 
much R is required to be P than to be Q, it follows that: if S is R enough to be P, then S is R enough 
to be Q; and if S is R not enough to be Q, then S is R not enough to be P; on the other hand, if S is 
R not enough to be P, it does not follow that S is R not enough to be Q; and if S is R enough to be 
Q, it does not follow that S is R enough to be P.” In this summary format, we resort to nesting: the 
major premise serves as primary antecedent, and the valid minor premises and conclusions appear 
as consequent conditions and outcomes, while the invalid moods are expressed as non-sequiturs. 
For example: granted that it takes more strength (R) to lift 50 kilos (P) than 30 (Q): if someone (S) 
can lift 50 kilos, then surely he can lift 30; and if he can’t lift 30, then he can’t lift 50. Needless to 
say, the conditions are presumed identical in both cases; we are talking of the same handle, on the 
same day, and so on. If different conditions are intended, the argument may not function correctly. 
The a fortiori argument is stated categorically only if there are no underlying conditions. Obviously, 
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if there are conditions they ought to be specified, or at least we must ensure they are the same 
throughout the argument. 
 
Thus, to summarize, there are four valid moods of copulative a fortiori argument: two subjectal 
moods, in which the major and minor terms (P and Q) are the logical subjects of the three 
propositions concerned; and two predicatal moods, in which the major and minor terms (P and Q) 
are the logical predicates of the three propositions concerned. The major premise is always positive, 
though it differs in form in subjectal and predicatal arguments. In each of these types, there are two 
variants: in one, the minor premise and conclusion are positive; and in the other, they are negative. 
The positive and negative versions in each case are obviously closely related – the minor premise 
of the one is the negation of the conclusion of the other, and vice versa; that is, each can be used as 
a reductio ad absurdum for the other. 
Note well the order in which the major and minor terms (P and Q) appear in the four moods: in the 
subjectal moods they are subjects; and in the predicatal ones they are predicates. It follows that in 
the two subjectal moods, the subsidiary term (S) is a predicate; and in the two predicatal moods, it 
(S) is a subject. The middle term (R), however, is a predicate in both premises and the conclusion 
of all the moods, note well. In subjectal moods it is a predicate of the major and minor terms (P 
and Q); in the predicatal moods it is a predicate of unspecified subjects in the major premise and a 
predicate of the subsidiary term (S) in the minor premise and conclusion, the subsidiary term being 
one instance of the unspecified subject-matter of the major premise. 
The difference between subjectal and predicatal moods is called a difference of structure. The 
difference between positive and negative moods is called a difference of polarity. The difference 
between moods that go “from minor to major” and those that go “from major to minor” is called a 
difference of orientation. Sometimes this difference of direction is stated in Latin, as “a minori ad 
majus” and “a majori ad minus”2. Note that the “from” term may be the minor or major and occurs 
in the minor premise; and the “to” term is accordingly the major or minor, respectively, and occurs 
in the conclusion. Notice the variations in orientation in accord with the structure and polarity 
involved. 
In sum, these four valid moods are effectively four distinct figures (and not merely moods) of a 
fortiori argument, since the placement of their terms differs significantly in each case. This is 
clearly seen in the following table: 
  
                                                 
 
2  I notice that that the Soncino Talmud does not apparently use the term a fortiori as a general term, but 
distinguishes between a minori and a fortiori (instead of a majori). Maybe this was an error. In any case, in my opinion, 
such usage should be avoided as it would leave us with no general term. The term a fortiori is needed as a common 
label for all forms of the argument. Whereas a majori means from the major (term to the minor term), a fortiori means 
with stronger (reason); so these expressions are not equivalent. 
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Figure/mood +s –s +p –p 
major premise PQR PQR RPQ RPQ 
minor premise QRS PRS SRP SRQ 
conclusion PRS QRS SRQ SRP 
Table 1.1 
 
We shall deal with the validation of all these arguments further on. Meanwhile, the following 
clarifications should also be kept in mind: 
• The expression “all the more,” and others like it (such as “a fortiori,” “how much more,” and 
so on), are often used in practice to signal an intention of a fortiori argument. This is useful 
specifically when the argument is only partly explicit; but when the argument is fully explicit, 
as shown above, such expression is in fact redundant, and (as we shall see) can even be 
misleading (suggestive of ‘proportionality’). When the argument is stated in full, it is sufficient 
to say “therefore” to signal the conclusion; nothing is added by saying “all the more.” 
Incidentally, in practice people sometimes reserve “all the more” for argument that goes from 
minor to major and “all the less” for argument that goes from major to minor; but it is also true 
that the expression “all the more” (and others like it) is also often used indiscriminately, and 
this is the way we usually intend it here. 
• The four arguments function just as well if the major term is greater (in respect of the middle 
term) than the minor term, or if they are equal. Whence, I have inserted in brackets in each 
mood: an “as much as” alternative clause to “more than” in the major premise, and an “equally” 
alternative to the traditional expression “all the more” in the conclusion. So though we have 
four figures, we may say that they contain two moods each, a ‘superior’ and an ‘egalitarian’ 
one, making a total of eight moods. Egalitarian a fortiori argument is also sometimes called ‘a 
pari’. 
• Note that for subjectal moods, I have specified the major premise as “P is more R than Q (is 
R)” – this is done to avoid confusion with a proposition of the form “P is more R than (P is) 
Q.” If we try using the latter with “P is Q enough to be S” to conclude “P is R enough to be S,” 
we would have an argument vaguely resembling a fortiori but which is in fact invalid3. In the 
valid form, Rp > Rq; whereas in the fake form Rp > Qp. Watch out for occurrences of this 
fallacy in common discourse. 
The major premise of predicatal argument, i.e. “More R is required to be P than to be Q,” does 
not have the same potential for ambiguity. Note, however, that it could alternatively be 
formulated as “To be P requires more R than to be Q (requires R)” – in which form it might be 
                                                 
 
3  For example, “This screw is longer than it is wide; and it is wide enough to fit into this hole; therefore it is 
long enough to do so.” Clearly, this would be fallacious reasoning; the conclusion does not follow from the premises. 
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confused with the major premise of subjectal argument, viz. “What is P is more R than what is 
Q (is R).”4 
• The major premise may occasionally in practice be converted – i.e. it may be stated, in subjectal 
argument, as “Q is less R than P” instead of as “P is more R than Q;” and in predicatal argument, 
as “Less R is required to be Q than to be P” instead of as “More R is required to be P than to be 
Q.” The validity of the argument in such cases is not affected, provided the minor premise and 
conclusion remain the same. Note this proviso well. Very often, such conversion of the major 
premise confuses people and they erroneously transpose the minor premise and conclusion5. 
Arguments involving such converted major premises, which may be labeled ‘inferior’, should 
not be counted as distinct moods. 
• In practice, the major premise is very often simply left out. The proponent of a given argument 
may have it explicitly or tacitly in mind. But he may also be quite unaware of it, in which case 
it is only we logicians who tell him it is logically present in the background and playing an 
active role in the inference. This is not something peculiar to a fortiori argument, but is likewise 
often encountered in syllogism and other forms of argument. It is called enthymemic argument 
(a mere technical term); you can call it abridged or abbreviated argument, if you like. 
• Concerning the minor premise and conclusion, the phrase “R enough to be” is often left out in 
practice. This may occur with the major premise absent, so that the middle term (R) is 
completely unstated (though of course still logically implicit); or it may occur with the major 
premise present, in which case the mention of the middle term in it is deemed sufficient for the 
whole argument. When the said phrase is left out, the minor premise and conclusion are usually 
stated in one if–then proposition: e.g. “If Q is S, then P is S,” which (to repeat) may be combined 
with an explicit major premise or presented alone. 
The fact that often in practice the middle term R is left tacit should not blind us to the fact that 
it is a sine qua non for successful a fortiori argument. The proposition “P is more R than Q” 
combined with “Q is S” is logically quite compatible with “P is not S;” or combined with “P is 
not S” is logically quite compatible with “Q is S.” Similarly, The proposition “More R is 
required to be P than to be Q” combined with “P is S” is logically quite compatible with “Q is 
not S;” or combined with “Q is not S” is logically quite compatible with “P is S.” Note this 
well. Many commentators fail to realize this, or having learned it quickly forget it. Without the 
relation “R enough to be” in the minor premise, the a fortiori conclusion cannot be drawn and 
the argument is fallacious. 
• Evidently, the clause “R enough to be” in positive moods, or “R not enough to be,” in negative 
moods, even if it is not explicitly stated in the minor premise and conclusion, is absolutely 
essential to a fortiori argument. If there is no intended threshold of R to be attained or surpassed 
in order for S to be predicated of or to be subject to the major and minor terms, there is no 
operative a fortiori argument (though there might be some other thought-process, such as mere 
                                                 
 
4  We might also put the major premise of subjectal argument in the form: “More R is found in P than in Q.” 
However, the most natural form for the subjectal major premise is active and that for the predicatal major premise is 
passive. 
5  To avoid confusion always simply reflect on the question: which term ‘is more R’ or ‘requires more R’ than 
the other? 
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analogy). This is evident from the fact that, without this crucial clause, we simply cannot 
validate the argument. Keep that well in mind. 
Note that the expression “R not enough to be” can also be stated as “not enough R to be” or 
“not R enough to be,” without change of meaning. The form “X is not R enough to be Y,” 
which is used in the minor premise and conclusion of negative subjectal or predicatal 
arguments, is the most ambiguous, being used for cases where X is not R at all, as well as more 
obviously to cases where it is R to some insufficient extent. More will be said about this further 
on. 
• Moreover, the middle term R must remain constant throughout the argument. That is, the 
middle term R specified in the minor premise must be identical with the one specified in the 
major premise. This can be seen by an example: although humans are more intelligent than 
horses, it does not follow that they can run faster than horses! Obviously, we can only speak of 
the superiority of humans over horses with respect to what was intended, viz. ‘intelligence’ in 
this case; this does not exclude the possibility that with respect to other attributes, such as leg 
muscles, horses are superior. 
On a formal level, what this means is that if we do not specify or keep in mind the middle term 
R intended in the major premise, we might easily intend another middle term, say R', in the 
minor premise and conclusion; in which case, our reasoning (whether unconsciously or 
deliberately done) would of course be faulty. This often happens in practice, and is one reason 
some people doubt the validity of a fortiori argument in general. But the problem here is not 
with the argument as such, but with the use of two middle terms. If we use, explicitly or 
implicitly, two middle terms, the argument is of course invalid, for it cannot be validated any 
longer. We could label such practice ‘the fallacy of two middle terms’ so as to remember to 
avoid it and not be taken in by it. 
• Any or all of the four terms, P, Q, R, S, may be a compound, i.e. a conjunction of two or more 
terms. This of course happens in practice often enough. 
 
It should be stressed that, albeit their various formal differences, the four principal forms of 
copulative a fortiori argument above enumerated truly deserve to be called by one and the same 
name; they constitute a family of arguments. The positive and negative moods of a given orientation 
(subjectal or predicatal) are obviously two facets of the same coin. But moreover, notice the 
similarity between the positive subjectal and negative predicatal moods, and also between the 
negative subjectal and positive predicatal moods. Note that the former two moods may be 
characterized as going “from minor to major,” and the latter two as going “from major to minor.” 
More will be said about this further on. 
The positive subjectal mood may be viewed as the prototype of all a fortiori argument, because of 
its relative simplicity. Many accounts of a fortiori argument tend to mention only this mood; or 
rather, examples thereof. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the other three copulative moods, 
or indeed their implicational analogues, can be ignored. They are distinct movements of thought 
that merit separate attention. 
I should also draw your attention to the possibility that the whole subjectal or predicatal a fortiori 
argument concerns only one subject, as shown next: 
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When this thing (say, X) is P, it is more R than when it is Q,  
and when it is Q, it is enough R to be S; 
therefore, when it is P, it is enough R to be S. 
 
More R is required for this thing (say, X) to be P than for it to be Q,  
and when it is S, it is R enough to be P; 
therefore, when it is S, is R enough to be Q. 
 
We can construct similar negative moods, of course. Notice that I have specified the subject as ‘this 
thing’ (or X) in both major premises, but these could equally be generalities, i.e. have ‘something, 
anything’ as their subject. Such single-subject a fortiori arguments are not mere theoretical 
possibilities, but often occur in practice. Note the conditional form the sentences take; these are 
really, therefore, cases of implicational argument (see next section). The conditioning may 
obviously be based on any type of modality – extensional, natural, temporal or spatial.  
 
2. Implicational a fortiori arguments 
In addition to the above four valid copulative moods, I identified in Judaic Logic four comparable 
‘implicational’ moods. The first two I called antecedental (instead of subjectal) and the last two I 
called consequental (instead of predicatal). These four moods have the same figures as the 
preceding four; but they differ in involving the relation of implication instead of the copulative one, 
and therefore theses instead of terms as the items under consideration. I list them for you anyway, 
just to make sure there is no misunderstanding: 
 
e. The positive antecedental (+a) mood: 
 
P implies more R than (or as much R as) Q (implies R), 
and, Q implies enough R to imply S;  
therefore, all the more (or equally), P implies enough R to imply S. 
 
 
f. The negative antecedental (–a) mood: 
 
P implies more R than (or as much R as) Q (implies R), 
yet, P does not imply enough R to imply S;  
therefore, all the more (or equally), Q does not imply enough R to imply S. 
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g. The positive consequental (+c) mood: 
 
More (or as much) R is required to imply P than to imply Q, 
and, S implies enough R to imply P;  
therefore, all the more (or equally), S implies enough R to imply Q. 
 
h. The negative consequental (–c) mood: 
 
More (as much) R is required to imply P than to imply Q, 
yet, S does not imply enough R to imply Q;  
therefore, all the more (or equally), S does not imply enough R to imply P. 
 
Clearly, mostly similar comments can be made regarding the structures of these additional four 
valid moods (or eight, if we distinguish between superior and egalitarian moods) as for those 
preceding them.  
In particular note well the fact that the middle thesis (R) is always a consequent (or non-
consequent), whereas the other three theses (P, Q and S) have varied roles as antecedents (or non-
antecedents) or consequents (or non-consequents) depending on the figure concerned. In 
antecedental argument, R is (or is not) a consequent of P and Q; while in consequental argument, 
R is (or is not) a consequent of S. Do not be misled by the fact that R is placed to the left of P and 
Q in the major premise of consequental a fortiori arguments. The thesis R does not there play the 
role of antecedent of P and Q (i.e. it does not imply them). The theses P, Q and R are there all 
consequents of some unstated antecedents; and thesis S is a specified instance of such unstated 
antecedent (in the positive case) or not so (in the negative case). 
Variation of the middle thesis. Concerning the middle thesis R, the sense in which it is 
quantitatively variable (i.e. that more or less of it can be implied) needs to be clarified. A 
proposition as such does not have degrees; so it would be incorrect to imagine that the proposition 
R as a whole has degrees. A thesis (e.g. Rp) is not a quantity, and so cannot be “greater” than 
another thesis (e.g. Rq). Therefore, when in the major premises of implicational a fortiori argument 
we say that “more of thesis R” is implied or required, we must refer to a variation in the predicate 
and/or in the subject within thesis R. This insight can be better understood if we formulate an 
implicational a fortiori argument in such a way that the categorical propositions inherent in it are 
made explicit. This can be done with antecedental and consequental arguments of whatever 
polarity. Consider for instance the following case, which is doubtless the most frequent: 
 
P (= A is p) implies more R (= C is r) than Q (= B is q) does, and 
Q (= B is q) implies enough R (= C is r) to imply S (= D is s).  
So, P (= A is p) implies enough R (= C is r) to imply S (= D is s). 
 
Here, I have shown each of the four categorical propositions as involving four different subjects 
(A, B, C, D) with four different predicates (p, q, r, s). The middle thesis R is here taken to mean 
that ‘C is r’. The variation of R may in this light be understood in various ways. In the most frequent 
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case, the subject C is constant and it is the predicate r within R that is variable, C being rp in thesis 
Rp and C being rq in thesis Rq (rp > rq). Comparatively rarely, the predicate r is constant and it is 
the subject C within R that is variable, Cp being r in thesis Rp and Cq being r in thesis Rq (Cp > 
Cq)6. In more complex cases, both the subject C and the predicate r might conceivably vary, Cp 
being rp in thesis Rp and Cq being rq in thesis Rq. The important point is that the resultant R theses 
can reasonably be said to satisfy the condition that Rp > Rq. 
As regards language, the major and minor theses might in practice be stated in gerundive form, as 
‘A being p’ and ‘B being q’, while the subsidiary term might more naturally be stated in the 
infinitive form, as ‘D to be S’. For the middle thesis, we might say ‘more r in C’ to signify that it 
is the predicate that varies, or ‘more C to be r’ to signify that it is the subject that varies. Quite often 
in practice, people do not state the whole middle thesis, but only the most relevant term in it – i.e. 
the variable predicate (usually) or subject (rarely). Thus, instead of saying in the major premise 
“implies more R,” they might say “implies more r” or “implies more C”; and likewise, instead of 
saying in the minor premise and conclusion “implies R enough,” they might say “implies r enough” 
or “implies C enough.” 
Strictly speaking, of course, this is inaccurate, because a lone term cannot be implied (or imply). 
The logical relation of implication concerns whole theses, never mere terms. But since this 
confusion occurs in everyday discourse, it is well to be aware of it and to take it into consideration. 
Thus, when in practice we encounter an a fortiori argument with whole theses as major and minor 
items, and a lone term as middle item, we should not think that this exemplifies a ‘hybrid’ type of 
argument which is partly copulative and partly implicational. Formally, such a construct is still 
implicational argument, except that the middle thesis is not entirely spoken out loud; i.e. either its 
subject or its predicate is left tacit. In the same way, the subsidiary thesis is sometimes incompletely 
stated. To validate such partly formulated arguments, we of course need to specify the intended 
unspoken term(s). 
We could in fact say that all a fortiori arguments are tacitly implicational. The thin line between 
copulative and implicational argument becomes evident when we reword a typical copulative 
argument in implicational form, as follows: 
 
P (= something being p) implies more R (= r in it) than Q (= something being q) 
does, and 
Q (= something being q) implies enough R (= r in it) to imply S (= it to be s);  
therefore, P (= something being p) implies enough R (= r in it) to imply S (= it to 
be s). 
 
This argument is obviously a special case of the preceding one. Here, instead of four subjects (A, 
B, C, D), we only have two (or even just one). They are unspecific (i.e. not labeled A and B, as 
earlier done), in the sense that they each refer to ‘something’ (i.e. anything – the intent is general, 
not particular) that is solely defined by the predicate initially attached to it (viz. p, q, respectively). 
                                                 
 
6  That we have to acknowledge the possibility that the subject varies in magnitude will be evident further on, 
when we consider predicatal a crescendo (i.e. proportional a fortiori) argument. There it is manifest that this is logically 
possible and occurs in practice. As regards the assumption that Rp (Cp is r) > Rq (Cq is r) is implied when Cp > Cq 
(rather than when Cp < Cq) – this seems reasonable to me at this time, though some uncertainty persists. 
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The ‘something’ that is intended in P and the ‘something (else)’ intended in Q are here distinct 
objects, note (although, as we have already seen, they could well in some cases be one and the same 
subject). Each of them is subject to a different measure or degree of the middle predicate ‘r’ 
(whence r is ‘in it’). And each of them is or turns out to be subject to the subsidiary predicate ‘s’. 
The case shown (here again) is the positive antecedental mood; the same can obviously be done 
with the positive predicatal mood, and with the negative forms of both of these.  
Looking back at the way I came upon these various argument forms when I wrote Judaic Logic, I 
remember first discovering the copulative forms and later, finding them insufficient to account for 
all examples of a fortiori argument I came across, I developed the implicational forms. In a sense, 
they were conceived as generalizations of the corresponding copulative forms. Indeed, I 
overgeneralized a bit, because I did not realize at the time that the notion that a thesis may “imply 
more” of another thesis is logically untenable. Much later, I started wondering whether ‘hybrid’ 
arguments signified additional types, besides the copulative and implicational. It is only recently 
that I better understood the relationships between the various forms of argument as above 
described. So the present account amends past errors and uncertainties. 
I should also here mention the following special case, where the major premise “P implies more A 
to be B than Q does” means “P implies that a number x of A are B, and Q implies a that number y 
of A are B, and x > y.” The change in magnitude involved in this case is not in the subject A or the 
predicate B inherent in the middle thesis, but in the quantifiers of A. So the middle thesis is not, as 
might be thought, about “how much A is B,” or even “how much B A is,” but about the frequency 
of occurrence of ‘A being B’. In such case, the proposition could be stated less ambiguously as “P 
implies more instances of A to be B than Q does.” The frequency involved may be extensional, as 
here; or it could have to do with another mode of modality, i.e. more often in time or place, or in 
more circumstances or contexts. 
Moreover, though I have here presented the middle thesis R as a single categorical proposition, it 
should be kept in mind that R could contain a compound thesis, i.e. it could involve a complex set 
of variable factors. 
In conclusion, when in formulating implicational a fortiori argument we refer to the middle thesis 
‘R’, the intention is more precisely ‘something in R’, meaning ‘some term(s) in thesis R’ or even 
‘some modal qualifier in thesis R’. That is, when we say: ‘implies more R’ or ‘more R is required 
to imply’ or ‘implies enough R’ – we must be understood to mean: ‘implies more of something in 
R’ or ‘more of something in R is required to imply’ or ‘implies enough of something in R’, 
respectively. Though I will continue to use the abridged formulae, these more elaborate formulae 
will be tacitly intended. 
More will, of course, be said about implicational a fortiori argument as we proceed. 
 
3. Validations 
Validation of an argument means to demonstrate its validity. An argument is ‘valid’ if, given its 
premises, its conclusion logically follows. Otherwise, if the putative conclusion does not follow 
from the given premises or if its denial follows from them, the argument is ‘invalid’. If the putative 
conclusion is merely not implied by the given premises, it is called a non sequitur (Latin for ‘it 
does not follow’); in such case, the contradictory of the putative conclusion is logically as 
compatible with the given premises as the putative conclusion is. If a contrary or the contradictory 
of the putative conclusion is positively implied by the given premises, the putative conclusion is 
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called an absurdity (lit. ‘unsound’) or more precisely an antinomy (lit. ‘against the laws’ of 
thought). 
The validity of an argument does not guarantee that its conclusion is true, note well. An argument 
may be valid even if its premises and conclusion are in fact false. Likewise, the invalidity of an 
argument does not guarantee that its conclusion is false. An argument may be invalid even if its 
premises and conclusion are in fact true. The validity (or invalidity) of an argument refers to the 
logical process, i.e. to the claim that a set of premises of this kind formally implies (or does not 
imply) a conclusion of that kind. 
A material a fortiori argument may be validated simply by showing that it can be credibly cast into 
any one of the valid moods listed above. If it cannot be fitted into one of these forms, it is invalid 
– or at least, it is not an a fortiori argument. The validations of the forms of a fortiori argument may 
be carried out as we will now expound. Invalid forms are forms that cannot be similarly validated. 
Obviously, material arguments can also be so validated; but the quick way is as just stated to 
credibly cast them into one of the valid forms. Once the forms are validated by logical science, the 
material cases that fit into them are universally and forever thereafter also validated. 
One way to prove the validity of a new form of deduction is through the intermediary of another, 
better known, form of deduction. Such derivation is called ‘reduction’. ‘Direct’ reduction is 
achieved by means of conversions or similar immediate inferences. If the premises of the tested 
argument imply those of an argument already accepted as valid, and the conclusion of the latter 
implies that of the former, then the tested argument is shown to be equally valid. ‘Indirect’ 
reduction, also known as reduction ad absurdum, on the other hand, proceeds by demonstrating 
that denial of the tested conclusion is inconsistent with some already validated process of reasoning. 
It works like this: Suppose A and B are the two (or more) premises of a proposed argument, and C 
is its putative conclusion. If the C conclusion is correct, this would mean that (A + B) implies C; 
which means that the conjunction (A + B + not-C) is logically impossible. Let us now 
hypothetically suppose that C is not a necessary implication in the context of A + B; i.e. that not-C 
is not impossible in it. In that case, we could combine not-C with one of the premises A or B, 
without denying the other. But we already know from previous research that, say, (A + not-C) 
implies not-B; which means that the conjunction (A + not-C + B) is logically impossible. Therefore, 
we must admit the validity of the newly proposed argument. Note that the two stated conjunctions 
of three items are identical except for the relative positions (which are logically irrelevant) of the 
items conjoined. 
Analysis of constituents 
The validation procedures7 are accordingly uniform for copulative and implicational a fortiori 
arguments. They are based on analysis of the meanings of the propositions involved in such 
argument, i.e. on reduction of these more complex forms to simpler forms more studied and better 
understood by logicians. 
The following are the two main reductions needed for validation of the earlier listed copulative 
arguments. The major premises (characterized as “commensurative” because they compare 
measures or degrees) of subjectal and predicatal arguments are always positive and have the 
following components: 
                                                 
 
7  See my Judaic Logic chapter 3, section 2 – ‘Validation Procedures’ – for additional details on this topic. 
However, note well, there are significant changes in the present treatment. 
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The subjectal major premise, “P is more R than (or as much R as) Q is,” means: 
P is R, i.e. P is to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rp); 
Q is R, i.e. Q is to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rq); 
and Rp is greater than (or equal to) Rq (whence: Rp implies Rq). 
The predicatal major premise, “More (or as much) R is required to be P than to be Q,” means: 
Only what is at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rp) is P; 
only what is at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rq) is Q; 
and Rp is greater than (or equal to) Rq (whence: Rp implies Rq). 
We could more briefly write the first two components of the predicatal major premise as exclusive 
implications: ‘If and only if something is Rp, then it is P’ and ‘If and only if something is Rq, then 
it is Q’; or more briefly still, as: ‘Iff Rp, then P’ and ‘Iff Rq, then Q’8. Note that in my past treatment 
of the predicatal major premise, in my book Judaic Logic, I did not specify the exclusiveness of 
these two implications; but their exclusiveness is clearly implied by the word “required.” 
The positive minor premises and conclusions (labeled “suffective” because they concern 
sufficiency) of copulative arguments have the following four components in common. The symbols 
X and Y here stand for the symbols P or Q and S as appropriate in each mood; that is, we may have 
“P is R enough to be S,” “Q is R enough to be S,” “S is R enough to be P,” or “S is R enough to be 
Q.” 
A proposition of the form “X is R enough to be Y” means: 
X is R, i.e. X is to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rx); 
whatever is at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Ry), is Y, and 
whatever is not at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. is not Ry), is not Y; 
and Rx is greater than (or equal to) Ry9 (whence: “Rx implies Ry”10). 
All this implies that X is Y, of course. We could more briefly write the two middle components of 
a suffective proposition as: ‘If something is Ry or more, then it is Y’ and ‘If something is not Ry 
or more, then it is not Y’; and these can be put together in a single proposition: ‘If and only if 
something is Ry or more, then it is Y’, which can be expressed still more briefly as: ‘Iff ≥ Ry, then 
Y’. 
Note that in my past treatment of suffective propositions, in my book Judaic Logic, I did not specify 
the third component, which is the inverse of the second component. I did not at the time realize the 
significance for a fortiori argument of this negative component, i.e. how essential it is to such 
argument; so this is an important new finding here. Note that since Ry implies Y and not-Ry implies 
                                                 
 
8  Note that the form “If X, then Y” (or “X implies Y”) can only strictly speaking be used if X and Y are 
propositions. If, as here, X and Y are terms, then we must strictly speaking say: “If something is X, then it is Y.” 
However, it is all right to use the abridged form in practice if one is well aware of this caveat. 
9  Note that in Judaic Logic, I here have “Ry includes Rx” – but it is evident that “Rx ≥ Ry” is a more meaningful 
and accurate statement, Ry being the threshold for Y and Rx being sufficient to pass that threshold and therefore equal 
to it or greater than it. The reason I complicated things in Judaic Logic is that I wanted to take into consideration all 
conceivable ranges (including discontinuous ones), whereas now I realize that the matter is simpler, because in relation 
to a fortiori argument specifically we need only consider continuous ranges. 
10  This implication is intended in the sense that a larger number implies every smaller number. For example, if 
I have $5, then I obviously have $3. 
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not-Y, we may say that there is a causal relation – more precisely, a necessary and complete 
causation – between these two items. 
It is this feature that gives meaning to the word “enough” (or “sufficiently”) in such propositions. 
This tells us that X has whatever amount of R it takes to be Y; i.e. that X has at least the amount of 
R required for Y. It informs us that there is a threshold of R (viz. Ry) as of and above which X is 
indeed Y, and anywhere before which X is not Y; Rx is then specified as falling on the required 
side of the known threshold. In some cases, of course, Rx is exactly equal to Ry; in such cases, the 
proposition would be stated more precisely as: “X is R just enough to be Y.” If it is known that 
Rx is (not equal to but) greater than Ry, we would say: “X is R more than enough to be Y.” Thus, 
“enough” means “either just enough or more than enough.” It is also clear from the above definition 
that another way to say “X is R enough to be Y” is: “X is too much R to be not-Y” (note the 
negation of the predicate in the latter form). 
Although a proposition of the form ‘X is R enough to be Y’ implies that ‘X is R’ and ‘X is Y’ and 
‘Rx ≥ Ry’, it does not follow that the latter propositions together imply the former, for it is not 
always true that there is a threshold value of R (Ry) as of which a subject (such as X) gains access 
to the predicate Y. Thus, we must know (or at least inductively assume) that ‘Iff ≥ Ry, then Y’ 
before we can construct a suffective proposition; without that threshold condition for predication, 
we do not have such a proposition. 
The threshold (Ry), though in principle an exact quantity, need not be precisely specified in 
practice, but can be vaguely intended by saying “the minimum value of R corresponding to Y, 
whatever it happen to be.” But in any case, note well, if there is a threshold, there has to be a 
negative as well as a positive side of it. We shall see the full significance of this insight further on, 
when we examine negative suffective propositions more closely. As regards the negative moods of 
copulative arguments (which involve such propositions), they can, as already mentioned, be 
validated by reductio ad absurdum to the corresponding positive moods, without pressing need to 
interpret their negative propositions. 
It should be emphasized that the kind of thinking that makes a fortiori argument possible depends 
on there being a regular increase or decrease of the middle term, i.e. along the range R. If we came 
across a subject (X) whose predicate (Y) varies with respect to R in complex ways – unevenly 
rising and then falling and/or vice versa, or fluctuating from positive to negative and/or vice versa 
– we would just not use a fortiori argument. Such argument form is too simple to deal with more 
complex variables. We would normally only use it for continuous ranges; for discontinuous ones, 
we would resort to more detailed descriptions and perhaps to mathematical formulas. 
Note also that ‘X is R enough to be Y’ implies ‘X is Y’ provided R is indeed by itself enough for 
Y. If R is in fact only part of a set of conditions necessary for Y, then factor R cannot be truthfully 
said to be ‘enough’ for Y – or, if it happens to be proposed as ‘enough’ for Y, the remaining required 
factors must at least be tacitly intended. This would mean, effectively, that the proposition ‘X is R 
enough to be Y’ is not as it appears categorical but in fact conditioned on the tacit factors, or 
alternatively that the outcome of R is not yet Y but some earlier stage of development than Y. To 
give an example of this important issue: suppose membership in an exclusive club depends on one’s 
age, level of income and maybe other criteria. In that event, one might well say, “this man is old 
enough but not rich enough to be admitted” – and here, obviously, the man being old ‘enough’ does 
not imply he will be admitted, although he may be put on a waiting list till he gets rich ‘enough’ 
too. Thus, in common discourse, the word ‘enough’ may not signify full sufficiency but merely a 
tendency towards it. But in the present treatise, we intend the word ‘enough’ in its strict sense. 
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The above general form of suffective proposition will of course concretize in different ways 
according to the orientation of the copulative a fortiori argument under consideration: 
In positive subjectal arguments (where P, Q are subjects), it will have the forms “P or Q is R enough 
to be S,” which mean: 
P or Q (as the case may be) is to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rp or Rq, as 
appropriate); 
whatever is at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rs) is S and 
whatever is not at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. is not Rs) is not S; 
and Rp or Rq is greater than or equal to Rs. 
In positive predicatal arguments (where P, Q are predicates), it will have the forms “S is R enough 
to be P or Q,” which mean: 
S is to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rs); 
whatever is at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rp or Rq, as appropriate) is 
P or Q (as the case may be), and 
whatever is not at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. is not Rp or Rq) is not P 
or Q; 
and Rs is greater than or equal to Rp or Rq. 
The formal difference between commensurative and suffective propositions ought to be clarified 
here, as I did not do this in my previous writings on this topic. Although their components are very 
similar in form, namely comparative and hypothetical propositions, what distinguishes them is that 
in commensurative forms the terms compared, viz. P and Q, are either both subjects or both 
predicates, whereas in suffective forms the terms compared, viz. X and Y, are one a subject and the 
other a predicate. For this reason, we cannot reduce commensuratives to suffectives or vice versa. 
Even so, it is well to notice that the major premise of predicatal a fortiori argument, i.e. the 
commensurative proposition “More (or as much) R is required to be P than to be Q,” is essentially 
about sufficiency. The word “required” tells us that there is an unstated quantity of R sufficient for 
P, whereas lacking that quantity, whatever it happen to be, being R does not entail being P; similarly 
with regard to Q, of course11. Thus, this major premise is a comparison between the thresholds for 
P and Q, telling us that amounts of R enough for Q are not all enough for P. On the other hand, the 
major premise of subjectal a fortiori arguments makes no mention of sufficiency, merely informing 
us that P is R and Q is R, and that these two quantities of R are one greater than (or equal to) the 
other. 
All the above comments can be repeated with regard to the propositions involved in implicational 
a fortiori argument, mutatis mutandis. Briefly put, we can interpret the commensurative major 
premises of a fortiori arguments as follows. 
The antecedental major premise “P implies more R than (or as much R as) Q does” means: 
P implies a certain measure or degree of R (say, Rp); 
                                                 
 
11  A requirement is a sine qua non. On this basis, we may add two components to the above definition of the 
predicatal major premise, namely: “what is not to the required measure or degree R (i.e. Rp), is not P” and “what is not 
to the required measure or degree R (i.e. Rq), is not Q.” I have done this simply by making the positive premise 
exclusive – i.e. adding “only” at the beginning of the clauses concerned. 
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Q implies a certain measure or degree of R (say, Rq); 
and Rp is greater than (or equal to) Rq (whence: Rp implies Rq). 
The consequental major premise “More (or as much) R is required to imply P than to imply Q” 
means: 
Only what implies at least a certain measure or degree of R (say, Rp) implies P; 
only what implies at least a certain measure or degree of R (say, Rq) implies Q; 
and Rp is greater than (or equal to) Rq (whence: Rp implies Rq). 
The suffective propositions which are used as minor premises and conclusions of a fortiori 
arguments can be interpreted as follows. Let us first look at the general positive form, “X implies 
R enough to imply Y;” this means: 
X implies to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rx); 
whatever implies at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Ry) implies Y, and 
whatever does not imply at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. does not imply 
Ry) does not imply Y; 
and Rx is greater than or equal to Ry. 
Notice that in the negative third clause of this definition, I have opted for the minimalist 
supposition. This choice seems sufficient to make the intended point, viz. that “without the power 
to imply at least Ry, Y does not follow.” I could of course have opted for the more emphatic 
interpretation, viz. “whatever implies less than that measure or degree R (i.e. implies not-Ry), 
implies not-Y,” but this would limit the application of the form considerably and unnecessarily. It 
could be that someone, or myself at a later date, considers the more emphatic option more 
appropriate; but until some specific reason is found to do so, we are wise to opt for the minimalist 
position. From the point of view of validation of a fortiori argument, both options are acceptable, 
because in both cases (as we shall presently see) the third and fourth clauses of the minor premise 
pass over intact into the conclusion.12 
The above general form of suffective proposition will of course concretize in different ways 
according to the orientation of the implicational a fortiori argument under consideration: 
In positive antecedental arguments (where P, Q are antecedents), it will have the forms “P or Q 
implies R enough to imply S,” which mean: 
  
                                                 
 
12  This question does not arise in the case of copulative suffectives, since “is” is negated solely by “is not;” in 
implicational suffectives, however, though the strict negation of “implies” is “does not imply,” there is additionally a 
stronger form “implies not.” 
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P or Q (as the case may be) implies to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rp or Rq, as 
appropriate); 
whatever implies at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rs) implies S and 
whatever does not imply at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. does not imply 
Rs) does not imply S; 
and Rp or Rq is greater than or equal to Rs. 
In positive consequental arguments (where P, Q are consequents), it will have the forms “S implies 
R enough to imply P or Q,” which mean: 
S implies to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rs); 
whatever implies at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rp or Rq, as appropriate) 
implies P or Q (as the case may be), and 
whatever does not imply at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. does not imply 
Rp or Rq) does not imply P or Q; 
and Rs is greater than or equal to Rp or Rq. 
For the rest, what was said earlier for copulatives may be adapted to implicationals. 
As regards the production of commensurative and suffective propositions, the following should 
be said. How are they produced, one might ask? That is, how do we get to know them in the first 
place? The answer is very simple and obvious. The above stated components of commensurative 
or suffective propositions may be viewed as the premises of the productive arguments giving rise 
to them. That is to say, the simpler forms, which we have above identified as implied in and together 
defining these more complex forms, may be presented as premises of arguments whose conclusions 
are commensurative or suffective propositions. Note this well, for here we have numerous new 
arguments for formal logic to list as such. There is, to be sure, a bit of circularity in claiming such 
arguments. However, though that may be true at the most formal level, at more concrete levels such 
arguments are quite useful. 
Validation procedures 
We are now in a position to examine a fortiori argument for purposes of validation. What must be 
understood is that the middle term (R) of copulative argument is its essential element. Being the 
subject or predicate of the three other terms (the major term P, the minor term Q, and the subsidiary 
term S), the middle term underlies, is present in, all of them. Similarly, of course, implicational 
argument hinges on the middle thesis. We can say that a fortiori argument is principally about the 
middle item, and only incidentally about the other three items; it is the core or center of gravity of 
the whole argument; it is the common ground and intermediary of the three other items. 
What a fortiori argument does is to relate together three values of the middle item R (here 
symbolized by Rp, Rq and Rs) found in relation to the other three items and thus representing them. 
The middle item of a fortiori argument is always something that varies quantitatively, in measure 
or degree – and the argument constitutes a comparison and hierarchical ordering of its different 
values (which are given in relation to the three other items). The truth of all this can be easily seen 
with reference to the following diagram, where quantities of R on the right are greater than 
quantities of R on the left. 
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Diagram 1.1 
 
That, then, is the essence of a fortiori argument: it is a comparison between the various quantities 
(measures or degrees) of the middle item (term or thesis) that are copulatively or implicationally 
involved in the other three items (as subjects or predicates, or antecedents or consequents, of it, as 
the case may be). We can thus present the quantitative core of the validations very simply as 
follows, with reference to the comparative propositions implied in the premises and conclusions. 
Here, as always, ≥ means ‘is greater than or equal to’ and < means ‘is less than’13: 
 
Structure Subjectal or antecedental Predicatal or consequental 
Polarity positive negative positive negative 
Major premise Rp ≥ Rq Rp ≥ Rq Rp ≥ Rq Rp ≥ Rq 
Minor premise Rq ≥ Rs Rp < Rs Rs ≥ Rp Rs < Rq 
Conclusion So, Rp ≥ Rs So, Rq < Rs So, Rs ≥ Rq So, Rs < Rp 
Table 1.2 
 
Note that the egalitarian positive subjectal (or antecedental) conclusion Rp = Rs can only be drawn 
from the premises Rp = Rq and Rq = Rs. Likewise, the egalitarian positive predicatal (or 
consequental) conclusion Rs = Rq can only be drawn from the premises Rs = Rp and Rp = Rq. In 
all other positive arguments, the conclusions would be Rp > Rs or Rs > Rq (as the case may be), 
even if one of the premises concerned involves an equation. It follows that the egalitarian negative 
argument of subjectal form has premises Rp ≥ Rq and Rp ≠ Rs and conclusion Rq ≠ Rs; while that 
of predicatal form has premises Rp ≥ Rq and Rs ≠ Rq and conclusion Rs ≠ Rp. 
Another way to illustrate the quantitative aspect of a fortiori argument is by means of bar charts, as 
in the diagram below. Given that Rp is greater than (or equal to) Rq, there are three possible 
                                                 
 
13  As regards use here of the ‘is less than’ relation in the negative moods, see the justification for this in the next 
section. 
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positions for Rs: in (a) Rs is greater than (or equal to) Rp and therefore than (or to) Rq; in (b) Rs is 
smaller than (or equal to) Rq and therefore than (or to) Rp; and in (c) Rs is in between Rp and Rq, 
in which case no conclusion can be drawn. Chart (a) can be used to illustrate the positive predicatal 
and negative subjectal moods, and chart (b) the positive subjectal and negative predicatal moods, 
while chart (c) can be used to explain invalid arguments. 
 
 
Diagram 1.2 
 
In addition to the quantitative arguments above tabulated14, we only need to select certain clauses 
from our premises to derive our conclusions, as follows (check and see for yourself): 
• The conclusion of a positive subjectal argument, namely the positive suffective proposition “P 
is R enough to be S,” is composed of four clauses: 
P is to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rp);  
whatever is at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rs), is S; 
whatever is not at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. is not Rs), is not S; 
and Rp is greater than (or equal to) Rs. 
In this case, the four components are obtained as follows: the first from the major premise, the 
second and third from the minor premise, and the fourth from the tabulated quantitative argument 
which is drawn from both premises. Here, note well, the “enough R” condition of the conclusion 
(implied in its second and third components) comes from the minor premise, because it concerns 
the subsidiary term (S). Here, then, the crucial threshold value of R is Rs, i.e. the minimum value 
of R needed to be S; knowing that Rq equals or exceeds Rs, we can predict that Rp does so too. 
• The conclusion of a positive predicatal argument, namely the positive suffective proposition “S 
is R enough to be Q,” is composed of four clauses: 
S is to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rs); 
whatever is at least to a certain measure or degree R (say, Rq), is Q; 
whatever is not at least to that measure or degree R (i.e. is not Rq), is not Q; 
                                                 
 
14  Looking at the tabulated quantitative arguments, we are tempted to say that there is ‘something of syllogistic 
reasoning’ in a fortiori argument, insofar as they all involve movement of thought from one item to another via an 
intermediary. But, note well, this is not really syllogistic inference from one class to another, but a more mathematical 
inference based on comparison of magnitudes. Clearly, we cannot say that a fortiori argument is syllogism; it is 
manifestly a distinct form of reasoning. 
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and Rs is greater than (or equal to) Rq. 
In this case, the four components are obtained as follows: the first from the minor premise, the 
second and third from the major premise, and the fourth from the tabulated quantitative argument 
which is drawn from both premises. Here, note well, the “enough R” condition of the conclusion 
(implied in its second and third components) comes from the major premise, because it concerns 
the minor term (Q). Here, then, the crucial threshold value of R is Rq, i.e. the minimum value of R 
needed to be Q; knowing that Rp equals or exceeds Rq, we can predict that Rs does so too. 
Note that in both the above moods, the conclusion of the a fortiori argument comes solely and 
entirely from the two premises together (not separately). It is true that the premises contain more 
information than the conclusion does; but that only means that not all the information in them is 
used. This does not signify redundancies in the premises, because their form is essential to intuitive 
human understanding of the argument, whose conclusion has similar form to the minor premise. 
The corresponding negative moods are most easily validated by reductio ad absurdum. We say: 
suppose the putative conclusion is denied, then combining such denial with the same major premise 
we would obtain a denial of the given minor premise; this being absurd, the putative conclusion 
must be valid.  
More briefly put, the positive conclusions are composed of the following elements drawn from the 
respective premises: in subjectal argument, “P is Rp, what is Rs is S and what is not Rs is not S, 
and Rp ≥ Rs;” and in predicatal argument, “S is Rs, what is Rq is Q and what is not Rq is not Q, 
and Rs ≥ Rq.” The corresponding negative conclusions imply that one or more of these four 
elements is denied. 
It is worth here stressing the utility of the threshold condition, i.e. the implication of the minor 
premise that there is a threshold value of R (say, Rt), which has to be reached or surpassed before 
a subject X can accede to a predicate Y (i.e. Rx must be ≥ Rt which is ≥ Ry). 
• In positive subjectal argument, the threshold of the minor premise and thence of the conclusion 
means that not all R are S (since some things are not Rs). Clearly, if all R were S, then we could 
from the major premise ‘P is more R than Q’ (which implies that ‘P is R’ and ‘Q is R’), without 
recourse to the simplified minor premise ‘Q is S’, obtain the conclusion that ‘P is S’ (and even 
that ‘Q is S’)! 
• In positive predicatal argument, one of the thresholds of the major premise and thence of the 
conclusion means that not all R are Q (since some things are not Rq). Clearly, if all R were Q, 
then we could from the major premise ‘More R is required to be P than to be Q’ (which implies 
that ‘R is required to be P’, and thence that ‘all P are R’15), together with the simplified minor 
premise ‘S is P’, obtain (via the intermediate conclusion ‘S is R’) the conclusion that ‘S is Q’! 
In both these eventualities, the argument would be merely syllogistic, and not function like an a 
fortiori argument. Thus, the threshold condition is essential to the formation of a truly a fortiori 
                                                 
 
15  Of course, ‘more R is required to be P than to be Q’ first implies that ‘specifically Rp is required to be P’ (as 
well as ‘specifically Rq is required to be Q’, and Rp > Rq), which means: ‘if not Rp, then not P’. But here, ‘Rp’ refers 
to the value of R required for P, whatever it happens to be; so it is no different (except symbolically) than the mere, 
indefinite ‘R’. In other words, ‘all P are R’ does not refer to just any or all values of R, but some appropriate value, 
whatever it happens to be. And clearly, this predicate R (meaning Rp) fits under the wider generality ‘all R’ in the 
syllogistic major premise ‘all R are Q’. Thus, we can indeed infer, from ‘S is P’ and ‘all things P are R’ that ‘S is R’, 
and from the latter and the supposed ‘all things R are Q’ that ‘S is Q’. 
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argument; it is not something that can be ignored or discarded. Many people think that a fortiori 
argument can be formulated without this crucial condition, but that is a grave error on their part. 
The same validation work can be easily done with implicational arguments, mutatis mutandis. We 
have thus formally and indubitably demonstrated all the said moods of a fortiori argument to be 
valid. As regards invalid a fortiori arguments, the following can be said. If the major item P is not 
identical in the major premise and in the minor premise or conclusion (so that there are effectively 
two major items), and/or if the minor item Q is not identical in the major premise and in the minor 
premise or conclusion (so that there are effectively two minor items), and/or if the middle item R 
is not identical in the major premise, the minor premise and the conclusion (so that there are 
effectively two or three middle items), and/or if the subsidiary item S is not identical in the minor 
premise and the conclusion (so that there are effectively two subsidiary items) – in any such cases, 
there is illicit process. Needless to say, “identical” here refers to identity not only in the words used, 
but also in their intentions; we are sometimes able to formulate two terms in such a way as to make 
them seem the same superficially, although in fact they are not the same deeper down16. 
Likewise, if an item or a proposition is negative where it should be positive or vice versa – here 
again, we have fallacious reasoning. Although all such deviations from the established norms are 
obviously invalid, since we cannot formally validate them, they are often tried by people in practice, 
so it is worth keeping them in mind. 
Identification in practice. We have so far theoretically described and validated a fortiori 
arguments. But the reader should also develop the ability to recognize such arguments when they 
occur in practice, in written text or oral discourse. The following are a few useful pointers. A fortiori 
argument is usually signaled by some distinctive word or phrase like “a fortiori” or “all the 
more/less,” or “so much (the) more/less,” or more rhetorically: “how much (the) more/less?!” Such 
signals are of course helpful, though they do not always occur (and moreover, they are sometimes 
used misleadingly, when there is no a fortiori argument in fact). Sometimes, we can guess that an 
a fortiori argument is involved, by noticing the use of an expression like “enough” or “sufficiently.” 
But sometimes, there is no verbal indicator at all, and we can only determine the a fortiori form of 
the argument at hand by examining its content. 
Very often, the major premise remains unstated, though it can be readily formulated in the light of 
the minor premise and conclusion. Very often, too, the middle term is left tacit, in the major premise 
or in the minor premise or in the conclusion, or even throughout the argument; in such cases, we 
have to guess at the underlying intent of the argument’s author. All we are given, in very many 
cases, is an if–then statement with three terms; and often the ‘if’ and ‘then’ operators are missing 
too! There is nevertheless usually enough information for us to reconstruct the intended a fortiori 
argument, assuming some such argument is indeed intended (i.e. we must be careful not to 
artificially ‘read in’ the argument for our own purposes). 
The following indices permit us to determine the exact mood of copulative argument. Find the term 
(S) common to both propositions (the premise and conclusion), and see whether it stands as subject 
or predicate. The positive subjectal form appears as: “Q is S; therefore, P is S;” and the negative 
subjectal form appears as: “P is not S; therefore, Q is not S.” Notice here that S (the common term) 
is a predicate, and P and Q (the other two terms) are subjects. The positive predicatal form appears 
as: “S is P; therefore, S is Q;” and the negative predicatal form appears as: “S is not Q; therefore, 
                                                 
 
16  See further on the discussion concerning ‘Species and Genera’. 
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S is not P.” Notice that here S (the common term) is a subject, and P and Q (the other two terms) 
are predicates. Similarly for implicational arguments, except that “implies” appears instead of “is.”  
Of course, not even all the details given in the preceding paragraph may appear. For example, 
instead of “Q is S; therefore, P is S,” the speaker may say “Q is S: all the more P!” But we can 
easily add the missing clause “is S” that makes the consequent (conclusion) a mirror image of the 
antecedent (minor premise). We must then look for a middle term R, such that “P is more R than 
Q” is true (or at least somewhat credible), and also such that “Q is R enough to be S” is true, and 
therefore “P is R enough to be S” is likewise true – and we have reconstructed the intended a fortiori 
argument. 
Obviously, a proposition of the form “X is Y” does not, strictly speaking, imply one of the form 
“X is R enough to be Y” – that is, the mere fact that X is Y does not indicate that there is a threshold 
of R that needs to be crossed for X to be Y. Nevertheless, we often inductively infer the latter from 
the former by reasoning that if there indeed is an a fortiori argument there must indeed be such a 
threshold condition for the predication. Thus, we construct the more complex premise from the 
simpler given, thinking “well, if X is Y, it must have been R enough to be Y!” This concerns the 
minor premise; as regards the conclusion, we deduce the simpler proposition from the more 
complex. 
It should be stressed that the term common to the two given propositions is in some cases the middle 
term (R), rather than the subsidiary term (S). An example of that would be the sentence: “Q is bad 
enough; imagine what P would be!” Here, the common term “bad” is of course the middle term (as 
the expression “enough” indicates); and no subsidiary term is mentioned, though one can guess 
what it might be. A fuller statement of the minor premise and conclusion would thus be: “if Q is 
bad (R) enough to be avoided (S), then all the more P is bad (R) enough to be avoided (S).” 
Of course, though we may manage to fully reconstruct the intended a fortiori argument, it may yet 
be found invalid – e.g. if, as sometimes happens, the roles of P and Q are reversed; but this is 
another issue, of course. That is: first find out what form the author’s intended argument has; then 
judge whether it is objectively valid or not. Also, do not confuse the issues of validity and truth: 
the argument may be well-formed, and yet be wrong due to its reliance on a false premise or other. 
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